Analogical reasoning in a 16-yr-old female chimpan7.ee (Sarah) was studied in five experiments. The general design of the analogy problems was where same was Sarah's plastic symbol for "same." Sarah solved analogy problems with two types of displays: (a) forced choice, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct B' from a set of alternatives (Experiments IA, In, and 3A) and (b) same-different, in which she had to complete an analogy by choosing the correct predicate, Same or Different (Experiments 2 and JB). In addition, she correctly solved both figural analogy problems, in which the stimuli were geometric figures and the relations among them were differences in size, color, or marking (Experiments IA, In, and 2), and conceptual analogy problems, in which the stimuli were household objects and the relations were functional and spatial (Experiments 3A and 3n). Simple mechanisms for problem solution, e.g., physical matching, feature combination, and choice on the basis of association, were ruled out. The data strongly indicate that Sarah used the relation between A and A' to solve the analogy problems (Experiment IB). The implications for theories of human and animal cognition are discussed.
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Reasoning is typically divided into deduction and induction (e.g., Copi, 1972; Dillman, 1973; Strawson, 1952; Woodworth, 1921) . In deduction, the input leads compellingly to the conclusion, whereas in induction, the input provides probable, but not absolute, evidence for the conclusion (see Copi, 1972) . One important type of induction is analogical reasoning (Copi, 1972; Spearman, 1923) . Analogical reasoning involves either judging the equivalence of relations (e.g., is the relation between A and A' the same as that between B and B') or completion of one relation so that it is equivalent to another (e.g., A is to A' as B is to ?; see Sternberg, 1977) . "Dog is to puppy as cat is to kitten" illustrates an analogy, since a relation between dog and puppy and a relation between cat and kitten are the same (adult-young of the same species).
Because analogical reasoning is important in both logicians' and psychologists' discussions of reasoning (e.g., Copi, 1972; Rumelhart & Abrahamson, 1973; Spearman, 1923; Sternberg, 1977) , the present experiments were designed to investigate a chimpanzee's ability to reason analogically. In addition, two practical considerations guided the choice of analogical reasoning for these experiments. First, analogy problems can be, and often are, in the case of human testing, based on nonverbal materials (see Sternberg, 1977 , for examples); this was appropriate because the subject lacked an extensive lexicon and a test of her reasoning ability could not rely primarily on verbal material (see Premack, 1976 , for a review of Sarah's language training). Second, analogy problems are widely used in human intelligence tests(e.g., Miller, 1960) , which allows for a comparison of this type of inductive reasoning in the human and the chimpanzee.
Two types of analogy problems were given, one figural, the other conceptual. In Experiments IA, IB, and 2, we gave Sarah figural analogies based on geometric figures of various shapes, sizes, colors, and markings. Such figural analogies are common in experiments and tests of human reasoning (e.g., Sternberg, 1977) . In Experiments 3A and 3e, we gave conceptual problems based on household items familiar to Sarah. In both cases, the problem display was essentially the same. A completed analogy, as shown in Figure 1 , took the form
where same was a yellow plastic rectangle, Sarah's symbol for Same. Trials were of two kinds. In forced-choice problems, Sarah was given the problem A:A' same B:? and was required to complete the analogy by choosing B' from a set of alternatives. In same-different problems, Sarah was given either a correct analogy, A:A : ? B:B', or an incorrect one, A:A'? B:C, and was required to choose the predicate either Same or Different.
Experiment IA
In Experiment IA, Sarah received forcedchoice analogy problems with geometric figures. The problems were constructed as follows: A is to A' as B is to which of two alternatives, B' or C. The problem display was as described above, with A and A' at the top and bottom left, respectively, B at the top right, and the symbol for Same in the center. The answer alternatives, B' and C, were presented next to the problem display. The relation between A and A' involved a difference in size, color, or marking. The relation between B and B' was the same as that between A and A'. The incorrect alternative, C, served as a control for various simple ways in which Sarah might have chosen the correct answer.
Method
Subjrcl and appnrutitfi. The subject was Sarah, a 16-yr-old female chimpan7.ee (Tun rrtfylfHlyifs).
Sarah had served in a variety of experiments on language and cognitive processes (Premack, 1976; .
A familiar trainer conducted the experiment in Sarah's'home cage area. The trainer arranged analogy problems on a 45 x 30cm plaslic Iray just outside her wire mesh enclosure and presented answer alternatives on the floor between Sarah's cage and the tray. Sarah viewed the problem through a clear Lexan window and could make her choices by reaching through a 13-cm space between the mesh and the floor.
The experimental stimuli were 144 geometric shapes cut from colored construction paper and glued to 12 x 9.5 cm cardboard rectangles. The figures were green, yellow, blue, or orange. Figures had one of three shapes -a triangle, a crescent, or a square with a triangle cut out of the bottom (a sawtooth). There were three sizes of the geometric figures: 2.5 x 2.5 cm (small), 5x5 cm (medium), and 6.3 x 6.3 cm (large). The figures also differed according to marking; figures were either unmarked or had a black dot, I cm in diameter, on them. Every combination of shape, size, color, and marking was represented among the stimuli for a total of 72 different stimuli. In addition to the geometric figures, the experiment used Sarah's symbol for Same, a yellow plaslic rectangte, 5.5 x 2.5 cm (see Premack, 1976; .
Procedure. Sarah received five sessions of 12 trials each over a 6-wk period, with intervals of 3-30 days between the sessions. On each of the 60 trials, three of (he figural stimuli were set on the tray. Two similarshaped stimuli were on the left side of the tray, one at the top of the tra.y, (he other 1-2 cm below it, near the boltom of the tray (see Figure I for an example of a forced-choice problem). The upper left stimulus (A) and the lower left stimulus (A 1 ) differed in only one dimension-color, size, or marking. There were 20 trials in which the difference between A and A' was color; every possible type of difference in color between A and A' (e.g., blue-green, yellow-orange, blueyellow, green-orange) was represented at least once. On 10 trials there was a size increase between A and A', and on 10 trials there was a size decrease. On 10 trials the difference between A and A' was the addition of a dot to A', and on 10 trials it was the subtract ion of a dot.
In the center of the tray was Sarah's symbol for Same. At the upper right-hand corner of the tray was a single geometric figure (B)^The lower right corner of the (ray remained empty. The B stimulus always differed from A and A' in shape, but on some trials it was the same size, color, and/or marking as A. On trials in which the difference between A and A' was color, the B stimulus was the same color as A but generally differed from A in size and marking. On trials in which the difference between A and A' was marking, the marking of B corresponded to llvtt of A. bul A and B differed in size and color. On 17 of the 20 trials in which the difference between A and A' was size, the A and B stimuli differed in si/.e, color, and, generally, marking. On three of the size-change trials, A and B were the same size but different colors.
On each trial the trainer presented (wo answer alternatives. One of the alternatives (B') correctly completed (he analogy problem, that is, differed from B only in the same way that A' differed from A. There were four different lypes of incorrect alternatives. C. Table Al. In each session the procedure controlled for so cues from Sarah's trainer. The trainer arranged stimuli on the tray at the front of Sarah's cage, pla the alternatives on the floor in front of the tray, ca' Sarah, and left the room. On every trial Sarah proached the front of her cage, examined the prob ! display, and chose one of the alternatives by pickir up and placing it in the space al the lower right of display. She then rang a small bell inside her c;> summoning the trainer back into (he room. He recot Sarah's choice, told her "good" when she was con and "no" when she was wrong, and removed the stir to prepare for the next trial (see Premack et al., I' for further details). Since the trainer was not in room, he could not have provided inadvertent so cues when Sarah examined the stimuli and made choice.
Results and Discussion
Sarah chose the correct alternative on of 60 trials ( p < .001, binomial test). Sat chose B'on 10/12, 10/12,9/12, 9/12, and 7 trials in Sessions 1-5, respectively. 1 data are shown as a function of the type difference between A and A' -size, co!> and marking -in Table 1 . These data srn that she did not differ markedly in perfoi ance on this basis. Number of choices of B' per total number of trials as a function of the type of incorrect alternative is shown in Table 1 . Although Sarah's performance was significantly above chance only on trials in which the incorrect alternative involved an incorrect transformation of B, there was little variation as a function of the type of incorrect alternative.
The simplest rule that Sarah might have followed to solve the analogy problems in Experiment 1 would have been to choose the alternative that was the closest physical match to one of the stimuli in the problem display; however, much of the data argue against this explanation of her performance. First, on the 17 trials in which a physical match was available to her as the incorrect alternative, Sarah chose it only five times (on only 1 of 4 trials in which the incorrect alternative matched A, 2 of 6 in which it matched A', and 2 of 7 in which it matched B). Second, careful examination of the similarities between the stimuli on each trial fails to support the physical-matching notion. There were 32 trials in which B' shared more features with B than did C. Sarah chose B' correctly on 24 of these trials (75%). However, she also chose B' correctly on 21 of 28 trials (75%) in which B' and C both differed from B on only one feature. There were only 11 trials in which B' was more similar to A' than was C; Sarah chose B' on 7 of these trials (64%). However, she chose B' on 24 of 31 trials (77%) in which C was more similar to A', and on 15 of 18 trials (83%) in which B' and C were equally similar to A'. There were only three trials in which B' shared more features with A than did C; Sarah chose B' on two of those trials (67%). She chose B' on 39 of 53 trials (74%) in which C was more similar to A and on 4 of 4 trials in which the two alternatives were equally similar to A. Since Sarah chose B' when it was equally or less similar to the individual stimuli in the problem display than was C, it is unlikely that physical matching of B' and those individual stimuli can account for her performance.
A second simple strategy that Sarah might have followed involves a combination of features from two stimuli. Since B' was different from B in the same way that A' was different from A, B' combined features of B and A'. Thus, it might be that Sarah chose B' because it combined features of A' and B. There were 26 trials in which B' combined features of A' and B whereas C did not; for example, in trials in which C was an incorrect transformation of A or was a physical match with one of the stimuli in the problem, C did not combine features of the two stimuli. Sarah chose B' on 18 of these 26 trials (69%). However, there were 34 trials in which both B' and C combined features of A' and B. Sarah chose B' on 27 of these 34 trials (79%). Therefore, it seems unlikely that simple combination of features is sufficient to account for Sarah's choice of B' in the present experiment.
The preceding examination of the data indicates that Sarah's choice of the stimulus that correctly completed analogy problems was not determined by the similarity of that stimulus to the individual stimuli in the problem or by combination of features of two of the stimuli. One remaining explanation of Sarah's performance is that her choice of B' was determined by the relation between A and A'. Experiment In examined this possibility.
Experiment IB
Two simple explanations might have been invoked to explain Sarah's choice of the answer that completed analogy problems in Experiment I A.: physical matching and feature combination. The data in Experiment IA failed to support either mechanism. An alternative explanation of her performance suggests that she had to apprehend the rela-tion between A and A' in order to complete the analogies correctly. The present experiment explicitly controlled for the influence of the, simple mechanisms of physical matching and feature combination and further examined the relational account of Sarah's performance on forced-choice analogy problems.
Trials in Experiment IB were constructed in pairs. Each trial of a pair had the same A' and B stimuli in the problem display and the same alternatives. On one trial of the pair, one alternative was correct; on the other trial, the other alternative was correct. Both alternatives differed from B only on one dimension-size, color, or markingand both combined features of A' and B. Thus, the correct alternative was always a function of A, the relation between A and A' or the relation between A and B, not physical similarity to A' or B or a combination of features of A' or B.
Method
Subject and apparatus. The same subject and stimuli were used as in Experiment IA.
Procedure. Sarah received 28 forced-choice analogy trials with the. same procedure as in Experiment IA except as noted. The trials were given in two sessions of eight trials each and two sessions of six trials each. The interval between sessions was 2-26 days. The specific problems differed from those in the previous experiment. In addition, in the present experiment, trials were constructed in pairs. In each trial of a pair, the same A' and B stimuli were presented: only the A stimulus differed between the two problem displays. Each trial of the pair had the same stimuli as alternatives, B' and C. The alternatives were both similar to B except forcolor, size, or marking, and both combined three features of B with one feature of A'. Thus, the incorrect alternative was an incorrect transformation of B on every trial. The individual trials from the pairs were intermixed so that Sarah never received both trials from a pair consecutively. The trial order was as follows: IA, 2A, 3A, 4A, 3B, 4B, 2B, IB, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 7B. 6B. 5B, SB, 9A, IOA, 11 A, I4A, I2A, I3A, 9B, IOB. 1IB, UB, I2B, I3B (see the Appendix, Table A2 , for stimuli presented on each trial; trials are shown in the table in pairs, rather lltan in the order in which Sarah received them).
Results and Discussion
Sarah chose the correct alternative on 22 of 28 trials (p < .01, binomial test). All six of Sarah's errors were on different pairs or problems. Thus, she answered correctly on both trials of 8 of the 14 pairs (p < .01, binomial test).' Since Sarah could not have chosen the alternative that correctly completed the analogy problems on tl basis of physical similarity to A' or B > by combining features of those two stimu the present results demonstrate that the simple mechanisms cannot account f< Sarah's performance on analogies.
The trials in each pair differed in on three respects: the A stimulus, the relatu between A and A', and the relation betwe< A and B. Since Sarah was able to choo the correct alternative on both trials of significant number of pairs of trials, on of these three differences between the trin must have been the major determinant c her choice. Examination of the trials ii dicates that it is unlikely that the individu. stimulus, A, controlled Sarah's chok of B'. The incorrect alternative, C, share more or an equal number of features with than did the correct alternative, B', o every trial. In addition, neither alternate closely resembled A on any trial. Therefon Sarah's choice must have been determine by the relation between A and A', th; between A and B, or both.
There are several reasons to believe th: the A-A' relation was the more importan relation. First, physical factors in the di* play might have made the relation betwee; A and A' more obvious than the relatioi between A and B: A and B were separate! by greater physical distance than were / and A' and by the plastic symbol Same Second, physical factors in the stimuli als< might have made the relation between / and A' more obvious than that between / and B: A and A' had the same shape anc differed only on one dimension, whereas / and B differed in shape and often in severa other dimensions. Third, unpublished dat; (1980) from this laboratory support the idc: that Sarah can apprehend and use the A A' relation in analogical reasoning: In ai experiment similar to those reported here Sarah was given only A and A' and hac to choose among pairs of stimuli. She chost the correct pair, B-B', significantly often However, whether Sarah used the A-A relation or the A-B relation to choose the correct answer in analogy problems, it is clear that she solved analogy problems by apprehending a relation, not by some simpler mechanism.
Experiment 2
Analogical reasoning often involves a judgment of the equivalence of two relations. In Experiments IA and IB, Sarah had to complete a relation in such a way as to make it equivalent to another relation. In Experiment 2, Sarah received a different type of analogy problem that also resembled one commonly used in human analogy testing (Sternberg, 1977) . In problems in the present experiment, Sarah had to decide whether the relations between two sets of stimuli were equivalent. She was given an otherwise completed analogy from which the central term was absent. Sarah had to choose the correct term of equivalence or nonequivalence, Same or Different. On half of the trials, the problem display had A and A' on the left and B and B' on the right, and the correct answer was Same. On the remaining trials, A and A' were on the left and B and C were on the right, and the correct answer was Different.
Method
Subject and apparatus. The subject and stimuli were as described in Experiment IA.
Procedure. The procedure for the 36 trials of Experiment 2 was as described in Experiment IA except as noted. In the present experiment, the problem display consisted of four figures one each in the upper and lower left corners and the upper and lower right corners of the problem display. The figure at the lower left, A', was a transformed version of the one at the upper left, A. The difference between A and A' was in color, size, or marking. The figure at the lower right, B' or C, was generally a transformed version of the figure at the upper right, B. The difference between B and B' and that between B and C were also in color, size, or marking. On the 18 trials with A and A' on the left and B and C on the right, the difference between A and A' was different from that between B and C. On 9 trials with B and C on the right of the problem display C was a physical match to one of the other stimuli in the problem. A, A', or B; on the other 9 trials, the difference between B and C was in color, size, or marking. The stimuli from each trial are shown in the Appendix, Table A3 . An example problem is shown in Figure I .
Sarah was given her symbols for Same and Different, a yellow plastic rectangle and a red plastic rectangle, respectively, as alternatives on these trials.
The trainer placed these alternatives in a small, opaque, covered plastic bowl prior to the start of each trial before he entered the room and, thus, out of Sarah's view. The trainer placed the analogy problem in front of Sarah's cage and the bowl containing the alternatives between the problem display and the opening in Sarah's cage, called her, and then left the room. Sarah approached the front of the cage, examined the problem, opened the container, and placed her chosen alternative in the center of the problem display. Then, she rang the bell to summon the trainer back to the room. Thus, the trainer was never present at the same time that the alternatives were visible to Sarah and consequently could not have inadvertently cued Sarah about a specific alternative.
Choice of Same was considered to be correct on trials with B' in the lower right corner; choice of Different was considered correct on trials with C in the lower right corner. There were three sessions of 12 trials each.
Results and Discussion
Sarah chose the correct symbol, Same or Different, on 26 of 36 trials (p < .01, binomial test). She chose correctly on 5/12, 11/12, and 10/12 trials in Sessions 1-3, respectively. She chose Same correctly on 13 of 18 trials and Different correctly on 13 of 18 trials (both ps < .05, binomial test). She chose the correct predicate, Same or Different, on 8/12 trials in which A and A' differed in color, 8/12 trials in which A and A' differed in size, and 10/12 trials in which A and A' differed in marking. It is evident that her performance did not vary substantially as a function of the type of difference between A and A'. Nor did her performance vary as a function of the type of C stimulus on the 18 Different trials. She chose the correct symbol, Different, on six of nine trials in which C was a physical match to one of the other stimuli in the problem and on seven of nine trials in which C was an incorrectly transformed version of B.
In the present experiment, it is unlikely that Sarah chose the symbol Same when the individual stimuli in the problem were generally similar and Different when the individual stimuli were generally dissimilar. First, she chose Different on 6 of 9 trials in which there was a physical match in the problem display and Same on 13 of 18 trials in which there were no physical matches.
Second, a systematic examination of the stimuli in each trial fails to support the notion that Sarah chose the central term in the analogy problems on the basis of physical similarity among individual stimuli. Table 2 In fact, the general trend was a decreasing choice of Different as the number of differences between individual stimuli increased. The major exception to this generality is the increase in choice of Different as the number of features differing between A' and B increased. However, this finding may be due in part to the unequal distribution of trials as a function of number of different features. No trials had 1 difference, only 6 had 2 differences, 15 had 3 differences, and 15 had 4 differences. In addition, one notable aspect of Sarah's performance on trials in which A' and B were most different is that her choice of an answer was a function of whether the relation between A and A' matched that of B and B'. Thus, on trials with three differences between A' and B, Sarah chose Different on six of eight trials in which the two relations were different but on only two of seven trials in which the two relations were the same. Similarly, on trials with four differences, she chose Different on seven of seven trials in which the relations differed and on only two of eight trials in which they were the same. This choice of an answer as a function of the equivalence of the A-A' relation and the B-B' relation on 24 of 30 trials in which A' and B were the most different would not be expected by the simple notion that Sarah chose an answer solely on the. basis of similarity of the individual stirriuli.
As in Experiments IA and In, the data of the present experiment do not support the notion that Sarah's performance on analogy problems was a function of the physical similarity of individual stimuli in the problem. A more likely explanation of her performance, in concurrence with the results of Experiments IA and In, is that In Experiments I and 2, the relations between the geometric figures-their differences and similarities in size, color, mark ing, and shape-could be detected perceptually. A subject could compare A and A' in trials from those experiments and apprehend their difference without having to retrieve information from long-term memory. In contrast, most human analogical reasoning does require use of memory; for example, verbal analogies, such as car is to road as train is to track, require a subject to retrieve various attributes associated with car and road and with train and track to compare the relations between the two pairs of words.
The purpose of Experiments 3A and 3n was to examine Sarah's analogical reasoning abilities with stimuli that required retrieval from long-term memory for inference of the relations among the stimuli. In the present experiment, Sarah received forcedchoice analogy problems, with familiar household objects as A, A', and B and the answer alternatives, B' and C. The relations between A and A' were of two kinds: those between an object and an instrument that acts on that object, e.g., painted wood to paint brush, and spatial relations, e.g., lid to jar.
One seldom-controlled feature of tests of human analogical reasoning is that the correct answer is often a closer associate of the B term than is the incorrect answer (see Willner, 1964 ). The present experiment controlled for associations between the B term of the analogy problems and the answer alternatives with a procedure similar to that of Experiment IB. Trials in Experiment 3A were constructed in pairs. In each trial of the pair, the same B stimulus and alternatives were used. One alternative was correct in one trial of the pair, and the other alternative was correct in the other trial. The correct answer was a function of the relation between A and A'. In addition, the B stimulus and both alternatives were carefully chosen so that both answer alternatives were probable associates of B.
Method
Subject and apparatus. The subject was the same as in previous experiments. The stimuli used in the analogy problems in Experiment 3A were household objects with which Sarah had some previous experience. These objects included torn cloth, padlock, cut paper, a tube of glue, crayon, sandpaper, paint brush, and a knife, among others. See the Appendix, Table A4 , for a complete list of the stimuli.
Procedure. Sarah received 18 forced-choice analogy problems presented as described in Experiment IA except as noted. In the present experiment, the stimuli in the problem display and the two alternatives were common household objects. The problems were designed so that only one of the answer alternatives had the same relation to B that A' had to A, although both alternatives were likely to have some relation to B. The use of objects in this experiment did not necessitate any changes in procedure or in Sarah's choice behavior from Experiment IA. An example problem is shown in Figure 2 .
Trials were constructed in pairs as in Experiment IB. The same B stimulus and alternatives were used in both trials of the pair. In one trial of a pair, one alternative had the same relation to B that A' had to A and was, therefore, correct. In the other trial of the pair, the other alternative was correct. As in Experiment IB, trials from the various pairs were intermixed. The 18 trials were presented in four sessions. two of 3 trials and two of 6 trials. Stimuli used in each trial are shown in the Appendix, Table A4 , in pairs of trials, rather than in the order in which they were presented.
Results and Discussion
Sarah chose the answer that correctly completed the analogy on 15 of 18 trials (p < .01, binomial test). She chose B' on 3/3, 5/6, 4/6, and 3/3 trials in Sessions 1-4, respectively. Her three errors were on three different pairs of trials. Therefore, she was completely correct on six of nine pairs (p < .01, binomial test).
The problems in the present experiment controlled for the possibility that Sarah might choose the alternative most closely associated with B. Since Sarah chose the correct alternative on both trials of most pairs in which one alternative was correct on one trial but the other was correct on the other trial, an explanation of her performance simply in terms of association between B and an alternative is not tenable.
Although controls excluded the possibility that an association between B and B' was the sole determinant of Sarah's choice, the present experiment does not rule out the possibility that her choice was determined by an individual stimulus, A or A'. Examination of Appendix, Table A4, suggests that, in general, neither alternative was likely to be a close associate of A or A'. However, such an examination of Appendix, Table A4, reveals that B', the correct alternative, was often in the same conceptual class as A' whereas C, the incorrect alternative, was not. In fact, conceptual similarity of A' and B' is an unavoidable feature of conceptual analogy problems; for example, in Trial 5A, displayed in Figure 2 , the key and can opener are both opening instruments, whereas the paint brush is not. Similarly, in Trial 5B, the marker and paint brush are both marking instruments, whereas the can opener is not. Thus, it is possible that Sarah might have chosen B' on the basis of a shared conceptual class with A', rather than on the basis of the A-A' relation. Consequently, Experiment 3n used special controls to examine conceptual classification as a possible mechanism for Sarah's choice in conceptual analogy, problems.
Experiment 3u
Two possible mechanisms for Sarah's performance on conceptual analogy problems were discussed in Experiment SA: (a) that she solved the problems by analogical reasoning and (b) that she solved the problems by use of conceptual classes. Experiment 3fl examined these two possibilities by giving Sarah same-different analogy problems similar to those used in Experiment 2, but with household objects as the stimuli in the problems and conceptual relations among the stimuli. In addition, the problems were constructed in sets of three trials. The same stimuli were used for A, A', and B in each of the three trials of a set. On one trial of a set, trial type B', the lower right stimulus in the problem display, B', had the same relation to B that A' had to A; therefore, Same was the correct predicate on trial type B'. On the second trial of a set, trial type C B , the lower right stimulus in the display, C, was related to B, but differently from the way that A' was related to A; therefore, Different was the correct predicate on trial type C B . On the third trial of a set, trial type C A ., the lower right stimulus in the display, C, was related to A'. On trials of this type, the relation between B and C differed from that between A and A', and the correct predicate was Different. Trials of type C, v , were of special interest with respect to the possibility that Sarah might use only the common conceptual class of A' and B' to solve conceptual analogy problems. If conceptual similarity of A' and B' is the sole mechanism for problem solution in the present experiment, then she should assign the predicate Same on trials of type C, v asiwell as on trials of type B'. In contrast, if she uses analogical reasoning in the present experiment, she should assign the predicate Different on trials of type C A ,.
Method
The same subject was used as in previous experiments. The stimuli were household objects with which Sarah had some previous experience. See Ihe Append Tabfe A5, for a compfete list of the stimuli. Sarah received 30 same-different analogy tri: in three sessions of 6 trials each and three sessio of 4 trials each. The interval between sessions v. 2-23 days. The procedure was similar to tl described in Experiment 2 except as noted. In I present experiment, all four stimuli in the probk display were household objects. The A and stimuli were placed on a single cardboard stri 10 x 25 cm, on the left side of the display, ni the B and B' (or C) stimuli were placed on anoth cardboard strip, 10 x 25 cm, on the right sid Approximately 10 cm separated the two strips. Cai board strips were used to perceptually isolate and A' from B and B' (or C).
The alternatives given Sarah were her symbols f Same and Different. As in Experiment 2. the aid natives were given to her in a covered plastic contain which she opened only after the trainer left the rooi Thus, the trainer could not have inadvertently cm Sarah to choose a specific alternative.
Trials were constructed in sets of three. In all thn trials of a set, the same stimuli were used as A, A and B. In trial B', the lower right stimulus in tl problem display had (he same relation to B that . had to A; in trial type C B , the lower right stimuli in the problem display had a different relation to from the relation that A' had to A, but it was relak in some way to B; in trial type C A ., the lower rigi stimulus was not related to B but was related to A the lower left stimulus. On trial type B', the correi alternative was Same, and on trial types Cu an CA', Ihe correct alternative was Different F:at session contained one or two trials of each type, an the trials within a session were from different sets * trials. The stimuli used in each trial are shown i the Appendix, Table A5 , in sets of three trials, rathe than in the order in which they were presented.
Results and Discussion
Sarah chose the answer that correct! completed the analogy (in the case of tri: type B') or the nonanalogy (in the case of trial types C B and C, v ) on 24 of 30 trial (p < .01, binomial test). She chose th. correct alternative on 5/6, 5/6, 4/6, 4/4, 4/4 and 2/4 trials in Sessions 1-6, respectively Her six errors were on four different sel of trials. Therefore, she correctly assignei the predicate on all trials of 6 of 10 sel (p < .01, binomial test). The results further indicate that Sarah can reason analogically with complex stimuli and conceptual relations among the stimuli. She chose the correct predicate, Same when the A-A' relation was the same as the B-B' relation and Different when the two relations differed, on 80% of the trials and assigned the correct predicate to all trials in most of the three trial sets. Of particular importance was her choice of Different on type C A . trials, since A' and B' were similar on those trials. If the conceptual similarity of A' and B' had determined her choice in the present experiment, Sarah should have chosen Same on both type B' trials and type C, v trials. Her choice of Different on the latter type of trials indicates that conceptual similarity was not the mechanism by which Sarah solved the analogy problems in the present experiment. Rather, the data from Experiments 3A and 3e appear to be explained best by proposing analogical reasoning as the mechanism for solution of forced-choice and same-different analogies with conceptual relations.
General Discussion
Five experiments examined analogical reasoning, the ability to judge the equivalence of two relations or to complete equivalent relations, in a 16-yr-old female chimpanzee, Sarah. In Experiments IA and IB, she chose the geometric figure that correctly completed a forced-choice analogy problem of the general form, A is to A' as B is to either B' or C. Experiment I A indicated that her choice was due neither to physical similarity between the correct alternative and the individual stimuli in the problem nor to simple combination of features of the stimuli in the problem. Experiment IB ruled out these two simple explanations of Sarah's choice behavior and strongly supported the hypothesis that her choice of the correct alternative was a function of the relation between A and A'. In Experiment 2. she chose the correct predicate. Same or Different, in otherwise completed analogies (or nonanalogies). Her choice of Same and Different was not a function of the degree of similarity of individual stimuli in the problems. Rather, the data were consistent with the hypothesis that she chose Same on the basis of equivalence of the relation between A and A' and the relation between B and B' and that she chose Different because of a lack of equivalence between the two relations.
In Experiment 3A, Sarah chose an object that correctly completed an analogy among household objects; in Experiment 3n, she chose the predicate that correctly completed an analogy among objects. The relations among the objects in these experiments were complex. The design of the experiments excluded the possibility that she chose the correct alternative simply on the basis of its association with the B stimulus of the problem. In addition, Experiment 3s excluded the possibility that conceptual similarity of A' and B' was the sole determinant of her choice. As in the previous experiments, the best explanation of Sarah's behavior was that she chose the object that had the same relation to B that A' had to A in Experiment 3A and that she chose Same when the A-A' relation matched the B-B' relation but chose Different when the two relations differed in Experiment 3s. The data, taken as a whole, strongly support the hypothesis that Sarah can reason analogically in a variety of circumstances.
The finding that a chimpanzee can reason analogically invalidates the extreme claims that reasoning is an exclusively human cognitive ability (e.g., Huxley, 1897; James, 1890; Morgan, 1894; Thorndike, 1898) . However, broad claims about reasoning in nonhuman animals are not warranted by the data. Since the present experiments demonstrated only analogical reasoning, one type of induction, it should not be assumed automatically that chimpanzees can engage either in other types of inductive reasoning or in deductive reasoning. It is unlikely that there is a single mechanism, or even a small number of related mechanisms, underlying all types of reasoning. Thus, it is possible that an organism might be able to perform well on certain reasoning tasks but show deficits on others. In addition, it is difficult to assess the phylogenetic generality of reasoning since these experiments studied only one chimpanzee. Sarah has a unique experimental history which may have contributed to her reasoning abilities.
Although the present experiments do not allow broad claims about analogical reasoning in chimpanzees other than Sarah, previous experiments suggest that other chimpanzees may be able to reason analogically. Analogical reasoning involves recognizing that the relation between one pair of stimuli I is the same as the relation between another pair of stimuli. Therefore, analogical reasoning requires a second-order relation, or a • relation among relations. Prernack (1976) suggested that same-different judgments also require second-order relations. That is to say, recognition that there is a relation of sameness between two objects, A and A, and a relation of sameness between two other objects, B and B, involves an implicit equivalence of the relation of sameness in the two cases. The experiments on analogical reasoning in the present article make explicit the second-order relations and thereby provide compelling evidence for Sarah's abilities with them. However, since several other chimpanzees have shown same-different judgments with a variety of stimuli across many transfer tests (Premack, 1976) , second-order relations and analogical reasoning can probably be observed in many chimpanzees. In addition, the present experiments suggest that the chimpanzee can make equivalence judgments about a wide variety of relations in addition to Same and Different.
• . One of the striking features of the present experiments is not simply that Sarah can reason analogically but that the problem display used here led her to reason. Sarah has other cognitive abilities that she could have used to choose an answer: for example, she might have used judgments of physical similarity of the individual stimuli, an ability she has displayed in other tasks (Premack, 1976 ). Yet, the data strongly indicate that she used analogical reasoning and did so from the start of the experiment, since she chose correctly on 10 of the 12 trials in Session I. This immediate success suggests that Sarah may have a hierarchy of cognitive processes that she applies i new types of problems and that analogic, reasoning may be first in the hierarchy. A ternatively, the problem display in the pro ent experiments might have been ideal f< eliciting analogical reasoning: that is, diffc ent problem displays may be differential! effective in accessing particular cognith processes in an organism.
What processes might be involved in an; logical reasoning in the chimpanzee? A though explanations of animal reasoning i terms of associations have been popul; (e.g., Hull, 1952) , those that rely exclusivcl on associations do not seem particular] applicable to analogical reasoning. Any e' planation of Sarah's performance has i take into account (a) her use of the relatio between A and A' to choose B' in forcec choice analogies (Experiments IA, IB, 3/\ (b) her ability to reason analogically in boi forced-choice and same-different problem (Experiments 2 and 3B), and (c) her abilit to reason with perceptually evident rel; lions in figural analogy problems (Expei ments IA, IB, and 2) and with conceptu; relations that require deeper processin (Experiments 3A and 3a) .
The present experiments suggest th; there are two important processes in Sarah analogical reasoning: (a) apprehension r the relation between A and A' and (b) us of the A-A' relation (see also Spearman 1923; Sternberg, 1977) . A simple model ca account for the first of these processes ii figural analogies (Experiments IA, In, an< 2); for example, a subject might first com pare A to A' on a feature-by-feature basK The result of this comparison would be representation of the quality and direction of the difference between A and A'; fo example, comparison of a small, green unmarked triangle (A) and a medium, green unmarked triangle (A') would yield ; representation of the difference between / and A', an increase in size. A model b ' Rumelhart and Abrahamson (1973) make such a process explicit.
Although the relation between A and A in the figural analogy problems can be deter mined by computing the difference betweci them, this approach will not work for th< conceptual problems of Experiments 3A am 3B. One conceptual analogy problem, fo example, had a closed lock (A), a key (A'), and a painted, closed can (B) in the problem display and a can opener (B') and a paint brush (C) as the correct and incorrect alternatives, respectively (see Figure 2) . What are the differences between a key and a lock or between a can and a can opener? Locks and keys differ in many ways, e.g., shape, size, and color, as do cans and openers. Which of the differences is relevant? Moreover, are the differences between a lock and a key the same as those between a can and a can opener? It seems clear that the conceptual problems require a model based, not on determining differences between A and A', but on recognizing the functional relation between A and A'. It is of interest that Sarah was immediately successful on the conceptual problems: She chose correctly on each of the first six trials in Experiment 3A (p < .05). We can interpret her immediate success in either of two ways: (a) When shifted from figural to conceptual problems, she immediately recognized the inapplicability of computing the difference between A and A' and attended to their functional relation instead or (b) she did not compute the difference between A and A', even on the figural analogy problems, but solved both figural and conceptual problems by the same process, one that has yet to be clarified.
The second important process in Sarah's analogical reasoning involves the use of the A-A' relation. Either of two models seems reasonable to account for this step in Sarah's reasoning. The first model suggests that she might apply the represented A-A' relation to the B stimulus to produce a representation of B' which would then be searched for among the alternatives. This model can be exemplified by a figural analogy problem. If the A-A' relation were an increase in size and B were a medium, blue, marked triangle, application of the represented relation to B would result in a representation of a large, blue, marked triangle. A match between this derived representation of B' and one of the alternatives would result in choice of that alternative.
The second model suggests that Sarah might compare B with each of the alternatives separately, in the same way that A and A' were compared. This comparison between B and the alternatives would result in separate representations of each of these relations. Next, Sarah would compare the representation of A-A' relation with that of the B-B' relation and that of the B-C relation and choose an alternative when the two relations matched. Assume, for example, that the relation between A and A' was an increase in size and that B was a medium, blue, marked triangle, B' was a large, blue, marked triangle, and C was a medium, yellow, marked triangle. Comparison of B and B' would yield the relation of an increase in size, whereas comparison of B and C would yield the relation of a change in color. Since the A-A' relation matches that of B and B', B' would be chosen. The present data do not support one of these models over the other, and it is possible that both may apply, depending upon the problem display. The application of the A-A' relation to B seems particularly relevant for the forced-choice procedures of Experiments l/\, IB, and 3A, whereas matching relations seems relevant for the same-different procedure of Experiments 2 and 3fl. Trial   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40   A   MBUS  SOUC  LYUS  SYUT  MGMT  MOUC  MYUT  LOMC  SOUS  MBUC  SGUT  LBUS  SGUC  MOUT  LBMS  LBUC  MYMT  SOUS  SGUC  MBUT  LYUC  SYMT  MGUS  LBMT  LBMT  MYUS  SOUC  LBUT  LGMT  MBUS  MYUS  , SGUC  SOMC  MYUT  LOUC  SOUS  SOUC  MBUS  LYUT  MGMC   A'   LBUS  SGUC  LYMS  SGUT  MGUT  SOUC  LYUT  LOUC  SGMS  MOUC  MGUT  LYUS  MGUC  MOMT  LBUS  MBUC  SYMT  SOUS  SGMC  MYUT  LGUC  SYUT  LGUS  LBUT  LBUT  MGUS  MOUC  LOUT  MGMT  LBUS  MYMS  SGMC  SYMC  SYUT  LOMC  SBUS  SOMC  MGUS  LOUT  LGMC   B   MYUT  SOUT  MOUC  LYUS  LBMC  LBUS  SGUC  MBMT  LYUT  LBUS  SYUS  SBUT  MBMS  SYUC  LGMT  LGUT  LOUS  LOUC  MBUS  MBUS  SYUT  MDMS  SYUC  LGUC  SOMC  SYUT  MBMS  SBUC  MYUC  SGUT  LBUC  MYUT  MOUS  LOUS  MGUS LGUT
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Stimuli in Experiment IB
Note. Letters indicale, from left to right, size (Small, Medium, Large), color (Blue, Green, Orange, Yellow), marking (Unmarked, Marked), and shape (Crescent, Sawiooth, Triangle) for each stimulus. 
Stimuli in Experiment 3s

